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THE VALUE OF THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP: 
EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, and in response to the huge growth in demand for 
unsecured consumer credit, UK banks have reviewed, automated, de-skilled and 
streamlined traditional credit assessment techniques.  In pursuit of margin and market 
share, today’s due diligence relies increasingly on centralised data and statistical 
“certainty”. 
 
During this same period the nature of the banks’ “safety net”, the sanction of 
bankruptcy and court action, has changed too.  The effect of this is not only to 
increase the potential for recovery, in respect of bad debts, but also to increase the 
moral hazard problem.  However, increased risk is masked by creditor power in 
recovery situations. 
 
This paper draws on theoretical and empirical research from legal, ethical and 
economic viewpoints and suggests that a reappraisal of this aspect of the banker-
customer relationship is essential to restore trust, prudence and long-term profitability. 
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THE VALUE OF THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP: 
EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between a banker and a customer has its foundations in well-
established UK case law1, reinforced, since 1992, by a code of conduct.  Until 1997, 
however, the code was silent on the matter of dealing with non-performing loans.  In 
1997 banks made a firm commitment to 
 
“consider cases of financial difficulty sympathetically and positively”. 
 
Banks also pledged themselves to 
 
“ help you (sic) to overcome your difficulties”.2 
 
The banks’ commitment covers the period before formal insolvency action and also 
echoes a much-ignored plea from lenders for customers to give early warning of debt 
problems.  Amongst the motivations for making this plea is that problems can be 
averted and a customer retained.  Coincidentally, early warning of problems allows 
lenders to act to their own best advantage by taking individual action for debt 
recovery before the competing claims of other lenders level the “playing field” with 
the collective nature of the bankruptcy procedure. 
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The code is silent, however, on the banks’ treatment of customers following notice of 
formal insolvency.  At these times there is growing evidence that banks act purely in 
their own short-term interests3. 
 
This paper focuses on the law and practice surrounding personal and unincorporated 
business debt, although parallels in the corporate world are evident.  The paper looks 
closely at the banker – customer relationship at a crucial time of crisis (customer 
insolvency) and surveys the various influences placed on bankers including the 
increasing demand for consumer credit and society’s changing attitude to bankruptcy. 
 
The paper also looks at the statutory choices faced by insolvent debtors and their 
creditors and goes on to review the general economic factors that have coloured 
creditor behaviour during the last decade.  It touches on the operational handling of 
insolvency situations, the creditors’ policies towards problem debt and the ethical 
considerations that guide them. 
 
The paper concludes by arguing that in a highly competitive environment, where debt 
is a direct corollary to credit granting, banks can do much to regain the trust and 
security that lead to profitable lifetime relationships with customers. 
 
 
The banker - customer relationship 
 
UK retail banks operate in an extremely competitive environment and invest heavily 
in gaining competitive advantage.  Traditional banks suffer pressure on profit margins 
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and growing threats from non-traditional competitors such as supermarkets and even 
football clubs4.  Competitive pressures and available technology have, in part, resulted 
in an orientation away from the relational banking of the “old fashioned” high street 
bank manager, towards the standardisation and transactional banking of the direct 
seller.  Technical competence in lending is largely subordinated to systematic “credit 
scoring” and centralisation based on empirical information from a variety of sources5. 
 
Whilst streamlined systems for lending can reduce costs and increase profitability in 
the short-term it does serve to reinforce the moral hazard problems associated with 
dealing with borrowers at “arms length”. 
 
The legal relationship between bankers and their customers was investigated by the 
National Consumer Council in 19836 and reviewed by the Jack Committee, which 
reported in 19897.  Jack found that the legal relationship was robust and did not 
require urgent amendment8.  Both the NCC and Jack, however, were silent on the 
specific problem of non-performing loans and bad debts. 
 
With a widely publicised code of conduct in place, bankers and their customers 
should be more certain about their legal relationship.  Their commercial relationship, 
however, is far less clear especially as both retail banks and consumers have 
undergone significant changes in recent years.  Emphasis in the banker-customer 
relationship, bank training and professional education, has typically focussed on 
“beginnings” (the initial lending decision) and “endings” (the effective use of 
security).  Whilst these are undoubtedly important it is the “middle” (the quality of 
relationship) that must now be developed. 
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The emphasis on product based, transactional banking in the 1980’s and early 90’s 
had a marked effect on bank organisational structures and sources of income.  Banks 
enjoyed the benefits of profitability and sales growth but suffered from a lack of 
customer loyalty9.  Increased levels of competition and the advent of technology 
driven delivery channels have effectively compounded the problem by commoditising 
bank products and replacing inertia with a greater degree of customer empowerment. 
 
Consequently, by the mid 1990’s banks had begun to realise the importance of 
reintroducing “relationship management” and introducing customer retention policies.  
Although attitudes and practices are often slow to change in large organisations banks 
are beginning to balance the “lifetime value” of customers with the move towards 
individual account profitability10.  Banks also know that customer acquisition is more 
expensive than customer retention although few have applied this logic of this in 
dealing with bad debts, insolvency and defaulting customers11. 
 
US research has indicated that the long term success of firms, in terms of sustainable 
competitive advantage, is associated with investment in relationships with customers 
and suppliers12 (in banking, customers and suppliers are synonymous in certain 
circumstances since funds deposited in accounts are used by banks to fund lending).  
Fine tuning of communications with customers also gives benefits.  Specialised 
training and the focused deployment of staff can, therefore, help to engender the trust, 
satisfaction and commitment that banks desire in their relationships with customers13. 
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Insolvency Law and Practice 
 
Since passage of the 1986 Insolvency Act insolvent UK personal debtors have had 
access to a statutory Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) procedure which is 
designed to avoid the finality and penalties of bankruptcy.  The IVA between debtors 
and creditors was designed to allow viable sole traders to continue in business or to 
achieve a better and more orderly realisation of assets for the creditors.  The 
legislative provisions followed the recommendations of a review committee14 and 
extensive consultation15 that noted the need to “rescue” debtors and to distinguish 
between the dishonest and the unlucky.  Although the review committee also 
recommended a curtailed procedure for consumer debtors this was not carried through 
to the statute books and so the IVA “rescue” vehicle remains available to small 
unincorporated businesses and individual debtors alike. 
 
The IVA is a private contract for the satisfaction of personal debts.  As such it can be 
influenced by the quality of the relationships between lenders and debtors.  In this 
court-supervised procedure the debtor proposes how the debts are to be satisfied, 
under the guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner (IP) and under the protection 
of a “moratorium” on creditor action.  The creditors are given the opportunity of 
amending and accepting or rejecting the proposal16. 
 
Whilst bankruptcy ends the banker – customer contract the IVA does not.  
Consequently, creditor predisposition, influence and action have had an important 
place in the IVA procedure and the years since 1986 have seen a steady rise in the 
incidence and acceptance of IVAs17.  There is also growing evidence of their 
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successful application18.  At the time of writing around 25% of formal personal 
insolvencies are dealt with via IVAs. 
 
The choice faced by an increasing number of insolvent debtors is between IVA, and 
the avoidance of penalties, restrictions and opprobrium connected with bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy itself (liquidation of available assets).  The choice faced by the creditor is 
limited by the predisposition of the debtor towards bankruptcy in the first instance and 
by the existence of “moral hazard” which makes the IVA riskier for the creditor.  
However, a successful IVA can improve creditor recoveries and increase customer 
retention, since income from continued employment or trade is often included as a 
benefit. 
 
Moral hazard exists in the IVA situation because the creditor is forced by the 
Insolvency Act 1986 to make a choice between IVA acceptance and bankruptcy.  If 
the creditors choose IVA, debtors can take actions, unobservable by creditors, which 
transfer greater risk to creditors.  This is compounded by the lack of a formal 
investigation of the debtor’s affairs in an IVA and the debtor’s retention and 
possession of assets.  Creditors must be aware that over-ambitious repayment 
proposals made by debtors may look attractive initially but may fail to materialise as 
debtors fail to co-operate with the IP once the IVA has been accepted.  Creditors who 
doubt the integrity of the debtor or the IP can choose bankruptcy and the possibility of 
a public examination of the bankrupt in open court. 
 
Creditor experience of bankruptcy is rarely good as official costs and the preferential 
treatment of some Crown debts deplete available assets and average returns from 
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bankrupt estates are low19.  This contrasts with the overall experience of IVAs20.  For 
banks and larger lenders, with wider portfolios of debtors, successful IVAs are 
balanced against those that fail during their agreed term and return nothing.  In this 
way larger creditors are more likely to favour IVA acceptance since their overall 
experience is positive.  Smaller creditors, with their less extensive experience, may 
have more dichotomised views. 
 
The asymmetric bargaining power of larger creditors, a result of their corporate 
experience, centralisation and specialisation, security position and size of debt and 
their increasing use of professional “meeting services”, offered by Insolvency 
Practitioners, also helps banks, in particular, to influence the acceptance of IVAs more 
readily. 
 
Generally, larger creditors are able to use their experience and select only IVAs that 
have a realistic chance of returning better dividends than bankruptcy.  In these cases, 
their recoveries will be greater and, arguably, their retention of customers more 
marked. 
 
Economic considerations 
 
The fact that banks, as lenders, should be able to pursue profitable lending 
opportunities is not in question.  What is questioned, however, is the time-scale over 
which such profits are measured. 
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In the short-term it appears that banks have profited enormously from the 
unprecedented demand for unsecured consumer credit.  Annual growth rates in credit 
card debt, for example, calculated as part of the money supply - M4, consistently 
exceeded RPI inflation by 2 to 3 percentage points between 1996 and 199821.  Over 
the same period bankruptcy and IVA numbers have grown (See Figure 1) and are now 
maintained at a higher level (total estimated at 28,000 for 1999) than at any time since 
the recession of the early 1990’s.  In 1998-99 total insolvency growth outstripped the 
growth in consumer credit with IVAs maintaining their “share” of cases.  Petitions for 
bankruptcy also maintained high numbers, with around 65 – 68% of all petitions 
being granted and debtors being made bankrupt between 1991 and 199822 
 
TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Where banks hold unsecured debt the tendency in corporate insolvency has been 
towards liquidation (bankruptcy) rather than rescue or rehabilitation.  Smaller 
businesses appear not to warrant bank involvement in workouts23 and the same policy 
appears to be adopted for unincorporated businesses and personal debtors.  This 
approach is typically justified by banks on the basis that there is no point “putting 
good money after bad” (sic) 24. 
 
The financial argument for this is clear: the amount of debt written off (debt less 
recoveries) can influence specific provisions for bad and doubtful debt, net profits and 
tax charges.  Transaction costs incurred in account intervention will merely add to 
losses in the short-term. 
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The longer-term economic argument is less clear but sees write-offs as “sunk costs”.  
Normal costs of extending credit must take potential losses into consideration and be 
discounted in the risk related interest rate charged.  The decision to invest in 
relationships with debtors should not, therefore, take the bad debt loss into account.  
Instead, the decision should compare the risk weighted “lifetime value” of the debtor 
against the cost of a more detailed investment in customer rehabilitation. 
 
In a congested and competitive market such a policy may be more commercially 
viable in the longer term, especially where both legislation and social values want to 
encourage “serial entrepreneurs”25 and where large numbers of bankrupts are repaying 
nothing to their lenders.  Taking a slightly different perspective, customer information 
relating to crisis and rehabilitation could eventually lead to danger signals being 
recognised much earlier in the day, allowing banks to take preventative action and, 
perhaps, even avoid the need for bankruptcy and IVAs. 
 
 
The ethical dimension 
In 1984 Cork26 recognised that changes in commercial life and society since passage 
of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 necessitated a review and refashioning of insolvency law.  
The 1986 reforms that Cork influenced recognised that there needed to be a balance 
between two separate views of bankruptcy: as a sanction against deviancy and 
consumer laxness (deterrence) and as a form of consumer protection27. 
 
In a society based on credit, bankruptcy will still exclude individuals from the credit 
system and act as a punishment.  It will also provide a “safety valve”, recognising that 
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credit providers share responsibility for over-commitment.  The key task in achieving 
this balance is to distinguish between the dishonest insolvent and the merely unlucky. 
 
The main actors in achieving this balance, apart from individual debtors and creditors 
themselves, are Insolvency Practitioners and their public sector counterparts the 
Official Receivers.  Cork’s28 recommendation of a licensing system for IPs and the 
professionalisation of the industry coincided with the government’s wish to reduce 
public sector involvement in the administration of bankruptcy.  After 1986 The 
Insolvency Service, an Executive Agency of the DTI, wanted to concentrate on fraud 
and malpractice investigations.  The strategy was to offer bankruptcy cases to the 
private IPs but the sheer numbers of bankruptcies that failed even to pay their own 
costs meant that by 1999 Official Receivers were involved in the administration of up 
to 50% of all insolvencies29. 
 
The attendant pressure on Insolvency Service resources has a damaging effect on the 
perception of the efficient administration of estates.  Although all bankrupts are 
subject to an investigation this may be paper based only, with much reliance placed on 
the debtor to provide information.  This may be a factor that adds to the attraction of 
bankruptcy for the dishonest debtor. 
 
Although no specific UK research has been undertaken into attitudes to bankruptcy 
there exist a number of other factors that help to shed light onto the conflicting 
attitudes to bankruptcy of creditors and debtors.  Factors exist that support the 
deterrence view of bankruptcy law, typically held by creditors, and the rehabilitation 
view, presumably favoured by debtors. 
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There is said to be a “stigma” associated with bankruptcy that supports the deterrence 
viewpoint.  Bankruptcy, IVAs and County Court judgments, so called “black” 
information, are routinely recorded and included in commercially available Credit 
Reference databases.  A Credit Reference search can highlight a previous bankruptcy 
or IVA for up to six years beyond the discharge of a Bankruptcy Order or completion 
of an IVA30.  Institutional creditors often base their credit-scoring and screening on 
such databases.  The existence of this negative information assumes an importance in 
decision making despite the fact that such information fails to distinguish between the 
dishonest and the “unlucky” debtor or the recalcitrant bankrupt and the debtor who 
works hard to ensure that the IVA succeeds. 
 
Banks’ also find themselves in a privileged position in bankruptcy through their 
taking of direct and indirect security and guarantees – a privilege maintained by the 
priority given to types of creditor in the Insolvency Act 1986.  An unpopular view put 
forward in 1992 was the outlawing of collateral that would: 
“ ….force banks into relationship banking, rather than simply paying lip 
service to it in hard times.”31 
 
This view ignores the increased cost of credit that unsecured lending would bring but 
does address the fundamental relationship between banker and customer. 
 
Creditors’ maintenance of a bankruptcy “stigma” is under pressure from government32 
and society in general.  A society based on credit generally has a greater acceptance of 
debt and a more permissive attitude to default33.  The sheer numbers of individuals 
seeking the protection of bankruptcy also serves to diminish its threat of censure34.  
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Together, the perceived inefficiency in official bankruptcy administration and the 
automatic discharge from bankruptcy after three years appear a favourable alternative 
when compared with the five years for the average IVA35. 
 
A more accessible feature of the equation, for UK creditors is the institutional credit-
trust relationship between lender and borrower.  Initial lending relationships between 
banks and new customers are likely to be deterrence based but will develop into 
knowledge based relationships where personal contact and repeated interaction are 
prevalent36.  Personal lending by UK banks is rarely relationship based, however and 
most “arms-length” consumer credit transactions will remain deterrence based. 
 
When the value of the deterrence diminishes, however, as society’s view changes and 
as bankruptcy law favours rehabilitation, the deterrent effect breaks down.  In addition 
the deterrence-based relationship is unlikely to engender any emotional or moral input 
by the borrower. 
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a dilemma for bankers.  It is a common dilemma as short-term 
profits are often prioritised ahead of long-term gains.  It also presents a range of 
options for the bank when customer default presages formal insolvency. 
 
Traditionally “short termism”, driven by the need to satisfy shareholders, has taken 
overwhelming precedence over the need to develop long term relationships with 
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customers.  Increases in the level of competition have, however, focused attention on 
the importance of customer retention and the active management of the banker-
customer relationship. 
 
Consequently, banks that were traditionally transaction oriented, with an emphasis on 
standardisation and centralisation, in an endeavour to reduce costs, are emerging as 
relationship oriented organisations.  The value and importance of relationship 
strategies in reducing moral hazard in the provision of credit to personal customers 
has been discussed.  The paper also recognises the impact of moral hazard on the 
administration of insolvency law, which, since 1986 has embraced the concepts of 
rescue and survival. 
 
Insolvency law has, in this respect, been ahead of the “thinking” within banks and, 
significantly, has reflected the changing ethical attitudes of society to debt.  In 
beginning to emerge as relationship-oriented organisations, therefore, the banks are 
adopting the values of society and the legal system but still have a long way to go in 
taking full advantage of IVAs.  In a competitive environment banks need to embrace 
the importance of business rescue and survival in order to benefit from customer 
retention and continuing relationships with their debtor customers. 
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Source DTI 
 
Figure 1: UK Individual Insolvency Growth 1987 - 1999*
(*1999 estimate based on Q1 and Q2)
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